We provide a unified view of many recent developments in Bayesian mechanism design, including the black-box reductions of Cai et. al., simple auctions for additive buyers, and posted-price mechanisms for unit-demand buyers. Additionally, we show that viewing these three previously disjoint lines of work through the same lens leads to new developments as well. First, we provide a duality framework for Bayesian mechanism design, which naturally accommodates multiple agents and arbitrary objectives/feasibility constraints. Using this, we prove that either a posted-price mechanism or the VCG auction with per-bidder entry fees achieves a constant-factor of the optimal Bayesian IC revenue whenever buyers are unit-demand or additive, unifying previous breakthroughs of Chawla et. al. and Yao, and improving both approximation ratios (from 33.75 to 24 and 69 to 8). Finally, we show that this view also leads to improved structural characterizations in the Cai et. al. framework.
INTRODUCTION
The past several years have seen a tremendous advance in the field of Bayesian Mechanism Design, based on ideas and concepts rooted in Theoretical Computer Science. For instance, due to a line of work initiated by Chawla et. al., we now know that posted-price mechanisms are approximately optimal with respect to the optimal Bayesian Incentive Compatible 1 (BIC) mechanism whenever buyers are unit-demand, 2 and values are independent [11, 12, 13, 30] . Due to a line of work initiated by Hart and Nisan [25] , we now know that either running Myerson's auction separately for each item or running the VCG mechanism with a perbidder entry fee 3 is approximately optimal with respect to the optimal BIC mechanism whenever buyers are additive, and values are independent [32, 1, 38] . Due to a line of work initiated by Cai et. al., we now know that optimal mechanisms are distributions over virtual welfare maximizers, and have computationally efficient algorithms to find them in quite general settings [6, 7, 8, 9, 4, 19, 17] . The main contribution of this work is a unified approach to all three of these previously disjoint research directions. At a high level, we show how a new interpretation of the Cai-DaskalakisWeinberg (CDW) framework provides us a duality theory, which then allows us to strengthen the characterization results of Cai et. al., as well as interpret the benchmarks used in [11, 12, 13, 30, 25, 10, 32, 1] as dual solutions. Surprisingly, we learn that essentially the same dual solution yields all the key benchmarks in these works. This inspires us to use it to design the first non-trivial benchmark with respect to the optimal BIC revenue in settings considered in [12, 38] , which we then analyze to achieve better approximation factors in both cases.
Simple vs. Optimal Auction Design
It is well-known by now that the optimal auction suffers many properties that are undesirable in practice, includ-ing randomization, non-monotonicity, and others [26, 27, 5, 14, 15] . To cope with this, much recent work in multidimensional mechanism design has turned to designing simple mechanisms that are approximately optimal. Some of the most exciting contributions from TCS to Bayesian mechanism design have come from this direction, and include a line of work initiated by Chawla et. al. for unit-demand buyers, and Hart and Nisan for additive buyers.
In a setting with m heterogeneous items for sale and n unit-demand buyers whose values for the items are drawn independently, the state-of-the-art shows that a simple postedprice mechanism (i.e. a mechanism that visits each buyer one at a time and posts a price for each item) obtains a constant factor of the optimal BIC revenue [11, 12, 13, 30] . The main idea behind these works is a multi-to singledimensional reduction. They consider a related setting where each bidder is split into m separate copies, one for each item, with bidder i's copy j interested only in item j. The value distributions are the same as the original multi-dimensional setting. One key ingredient driving these works is that the optimal revenue in the original setting is upper bounded by a small constant times the optimal revenue in the copies setting.
In a setting with m heterogeneous items for sale and n additive buyers whose values for the items are drawn independently, the state-of-the-art result shows that the better of running Myerson's optimal auction for each item separately or running the VCG auction with a per-bidder entry fee obtains a constant factor of the optimal BIC revenue [25, 32, 1, 38] . One main idea behind these works is a "core-tail decomposition", that breaks the revenue down into cases where the buyers have either low (the core) or high (the tail) values.
Although these two approaches appear different at first, we are able to show that they in fact arise from basically the same dual in our duality theory. Essentially, we show that a specific dual solution within our framework gives rise to an upper bound that decomposes into the sum of two terms, one that looks like the the copies benchmark, and one that looks like the core-tail benchmark. In terms of concrete results, this new understanding yields improved approximation ratios on both fronts. For additive buyers, we improve the ratio provided by Yao [38] from 69 to 8. For unit-demand buyers, we improve the approximation ratio provided by Chawla et. al. [12] from 33.75 to 24. In addition to these concrete results, we believe our work makes the following conceptual contributions as well. First, while the single-buyer core-tail decomposition techniques (first introduced by Li and Yao [32] ) are now becoming standard [32, 1, 36 , 2], they do not generalize naturally to multiple buyers. Yao [38] introduced new techniques in his extension to multi-buyers termed "β-adjusted revenue" and "β-exclusive mechanisms," which are technically quite involved. Our duality-based proof can be viewed as a natural generalization of the core-tail decomposition to multibuyer settings. Indeed, the core-tail decomposition which required substantial work previously is obtained for free: it is as simple as breaking a summation into two parts. Second, we use basically the same analysis for both additive and unit-demand valuations, meaning that our framework provides a unified approach to tackle both settings. Finally, we wish to point out that the key difference between our proofs and those of [12, 1, 38] are our duality-based benchmarks: we are able to immediately get more mileage out of these benchmarks while barely needing to develop new approximation techniques. Indeed, the bulk of the work is in properly decomposing our benchmarks into terms that can be approximated using ideas similar to prior work. All these suggest that our techniques are likely be useful in more general settings.
We view our major contribution as providing a duality based unified framework for designing simple and approximately optimal auctions. As an application, we provide a simpler and tighter analysis for both additive and unitdemand bidders. In particular, the fact that we achieve both results from the same dual solution provides strong evidence that even this particular dual solution (or at least the intuition behind it) is worthy of deeper study.
General Bayesian Mechanism Design
Another recent contribution of the TCS community is the CDW framework for generic Bayesian mechanism design problems. Here, it is shown that Bayesian mechanism design problems for essentially any objective can be solved with black-box access just to an algorithm that optimizes a perturbed version of that same objective. One aspect of this line of work is computational: we now have computationally efficient algorithms to find the optimal (or approximately optimal) mechanism in numerous settings of interest. Another aspect is structural: we now know that in all settings that fit into this framework, the optimal mechanism is a distribution over virtual objective optimizers. A mechanism is a virtual objective optimizer if it pointwise maximizes the sum of the original objective and the virtual welfare. The virtual welfare is given by a virtual valuation/transformation, which is a mapping from valuations to linear combinations of valuations.
Our contribution to this line of work is to improve the existing structural characterization. Previously, these virtual transformations were thought to be randomized and arbitrary, having no clear connection to the objective at hand. Our duality theory can say much more about what these virtual transformations might look like: every instance has a strong dual in the form of n disjoint flows, one for each agent. The nodes in agent i's flow correspond to possible valuations of this agent, 4 and non-zero flow from type ti(·) to t i (·) captures that the incentive constraint between ti(·) and t i (·) binds. We show how a flow induces a virtual transformation, and that the optimal dual gives a single, deterministic virtual valuation function such that:
1. This virtual valuation function can be found computationally efficiently.
2. In the special case of revenue, the optimal mechanism has expected revenue = its expected virtual welfare, and every BIC mechanism has expected revenue ≤ its expected virtual welfare.
3. The optimal mechanism optimizes the original objective + virtual welfare pointwise. 4 Both the CDW framework and our duality theory only apply directly if there are finitely many possible types for each agent. 5 This could be randomized ; there is always a deterministic maximizer but in cases where the optimal mechanism is randomized, the objective plus virtual welfare are such that there are numerous maximizers, and the optimal mechanism randomly selects one.
Other Related Work
Recently, strong duality frameworks for a single additive buyer were developed in [14, 16, 21, 20, 22] . These frameworks show that the dual problem to revenue optimization for a single additive buyer can be interpreted as an optimal transport/bipartite matching problem. More recent work of Hartline and Haghpanah [24] can also be interpreted as providing an alternative "path-finding" duality framework. When they exist, these paths provide a witness that a certain Myerson-type mechanism is optimal, but the paths are not guaranteed to exist in all instances. In addition to their mathematical beauty, these duality frameworks also serve as tools to prove that mechanisms are optimal. These tools have been successfully applied to provide conditions when pricing only the grand bundle [14] , posting a uniform item pricing [24] , or even employing a randomized mechanism is optimal [22] when selling to a single additive or unit-demand buyer. However, none of these frameworks currently apply in multi-bidder settings, and to date have been unable to yield any approximate optimality results in the single bidder settings where they do apply.
We also wish to argue that our duality is perhaps more transparent than existing theories. For instance, it is easy to interpret dual solutions in our framework as virtual valuation functions, and dual solutions for multiple buyer instances are just tuples of duals for single buyers. In addition, we are able to re-derive and extend the breakthrough results of [11, 12, 13, 25, 32, 1, 38] using essentially the same dual solution. Still, it is not our goal to subsume previous duality theories, and our new theory certainly doesn't. For instance, previous frameworks are capable of proving that a mechanism is exactly optimal when the input distributions are continuous. Our theory as-is can only handle distributions with finite support exactly. 6 However, we have demonstrated that there is at least one important domain (simple, approximately optimal mechanisms) where our theory seems to be more applicable.
Organization. We provide preliminaries and notation below. In Section 3, we present our duality theory for revenue maximization, and in Section 4 we present a canonical dual solution that proves useful in different settings. As a warmup, we show in Section 5 how to analyze this dual solution when there is just a single buyer. In Section 6, we provide the multi-bidder analysis, which is more technical. Due to space limitations, our extension of the CDW framework in settings beyond revenue can be found in the full version.
PRELIMINARIES
Optimal Auction Design. For this version of the paper, we restrict our attention to revenue maximization in the following setting (the full version contains our extension of the CDW framework in more general settings): there is one copy of each of m heterogenous goods for sale to n buyers. The buyers are either all additive or all unit-demand, with buyer i having value tij for item j. We use ti = (ti1, . . . , tim) to denote buyer i's values for all the goods and t−i to denote every buyer except i's values for all the goods. Tij is the set of all possible values of buyer i for item j, Ti = ×jTij, T−i = × i * =i Ti * and T = ×iTi. All values for all items are drawn independently. We denote by Dij the distribution of tij, Di = ×jDij, Di,−j = × j * =j Dij * , D = ×iDi, and D−i = × i * =i Di * , and fij (fi, fi,−j, f−i, etc.) the densities of these finite-support distributions. The optimal auction optimizes expected revenue over all BIC mechanisms. For a given value distribution D, we denote by Rev(D) the expected revenue achieved by this auction, and it will be clear from context whether buyers are additive or unit-demand. We define F to be a set system over [n] × [m] that describes all feasible allocations.
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Reduced Forms. The reduced form of an auction stores for all bidders i, items j, and types ti, what is the probability that agent i will receive item j when reporting ti to the mechanism (over the randomness in the mechanism and randomness in other agents' reported types, assuming they come from D−i) as πij(ti). It is easy to see that if a buyer is additive, or unit-demand and receives only one item at a time, that their expected value for reporting type t i to the mechanism is just ti · πi(t i ). We say that a reduced form is feasible if there exists some feasible mechanism (that selects an outcome in F with probability 1) that matches the probabilities promised by the reduced form. If P (F, D) is defined to be the set of all feasible reduced forms, it is easy to see (and shown in [6] , for instance) that P (F, D) is closed and convex.
Simple Mechanisms. Even though the benchmark we target is the optimal randomized BIC mechanism, the simple mechanisms we design will all be deterministic and satisfy DSIC. For a single buyer, the two mechanisms we consider are selling separately and selling together. Selling separately posts a price pj on each item j and lets the buyer purchase whatever subset of items she pleases. We denote by SRev(D) the revenue of the optimal such pricing. Selling together posts a single price p on the grand bundle, and lets the buyer purchase the entire bundle for p or nothing. We denote by BRev(D) the revenue of the optimal such pricing. For multiple buyers the generalization of selling together is the VCG mechanism with an entry fee, which offers to each bidder i the opportunity to pay an entry fee ei(t−i) and participate in the VCG mechanism (paying any additional fees charged by the VCG mechanism). If they choose not to pay the entry fee, they pay nothing and receive no items. We denote the revenue of the mechanism that charges the optimal entry fees to the buyers as BVCG(D), and VCG(D) the revenue of the VCG mechanism with no entry fees. The generalization of selling separately is a little different, and described below.
Single-Dimensional Copies. A benchmark that shows up in our decompositions relates the multi-dimensional instances we care about to a single-dimensional setting, and originated in work of Chawla et. al. [11] . For any multidimensional instance D we can imagine splitting bidder i into m different copies, with bidder i's copy j interested only in receiving item j and nothing else. So in this new instance there are nm single-dimensional bidders, and copy (i, j)'s value for winning is tij (which is still drawn from Dij). The set system F from the original setting now specifies which copies can simultaneously win. We denote by OPT Copies (D) the revenue of Myerson's optimal auction [34] in the copies setting induced by D.
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Continuous versus Finite-Support Distributions. Our approach explicitly assumes that the input distributions have finite support. This is a standard assumption when computation is involved. However, most existing works in the simple vs. optimal paradigm hold even for continuous distributions (including [11, 12, 13, 25, 32, 1, 38, 36, 2] ). Fortunately, it is known that every D can be discretized into
, and D + has finite support. So all of our results can be made arbitrarily close to exact for continuous distributions. We conclude this section by proving this formally. The following theorem is shown in [36] , drawing from prior works [29, 28, 3, 18] . 
Val(δ) denotes the welfare of the VCG allocation when buyer i's type is drawn according to the random variable δi(·).
To see how this implies that our duality is arbitrarily close to exact for continuous distributions, let D i be the distribution that first samples ti(·) from Di, then outputs
. So we can get arbitrarily close while only considering distributions that are bounded. Now for any bounded distribution Di, define D
to first sample ti(·) from Di, then output t
with the ceiling -1 instead of the ceiling. Then it's clear that D
+, i
, Di, and D
−, i
can be coupled so that t
(x) for all x, and that taking either of the two consecutive differences results in a δ(·) such that δ(x) ≤ for all x. So applying Theorem 1, we see that for any desired , we have 
OUR DUALITY THEORY
We begin by writing the LP for revenue maximization ( Figure 1 ). For ease of notation, assume that there is a special type ∅ to represent the option of not participating in the auction. That means πi(∅) = 0 and pi(∅) = 0. Now a Bayesian IR (BIR) constraint is simply another BIC constraint: for any type ti, bidder i will not want to lie to type ∅. We let T + i = Ti ∪ {∅}. To proceed, we'll introduce a variable λi(t, t ) for each of the BIC constraints, and take the partial Lagrangian of LP 1 by Lagrangifying all BIC constraints. The theory of Lagrangian multipliers tells us that the solution to LP 1 is equivalent to the primal variables solving the partially Lagrangified dual ( Figure 2 ). Lagrangian multipliers have been used for mechanism design before [33, 31, 37, 4] , however, our results are the first to obtain useful approximation benchmarks from this approach. 8 Note that when buyers are additive that OPT Copies is exactly the revenue of selling items separately using Myerson's optimal auction in the original setting. Definition 1. Let L(λ, π, p) be a the partial Lagrangian defined as follows:
Variables:
• pi(ti), for all bidders i and types ti ∈ Ti, denoting the expected price paid by bidder i when reporting type ti over the randomness of the mechanism and the other bidders' types.
• πij(ti), for all bidders i, items j, and types ti ∈ Ti, denoting the probability that bidder i receives item j when reporting type ti over the randomness of the mechanism and the other bidders' types. Constraints:
, for all bidders i, and types ti ∈ Ti, t i ∈ T + i , guaranteeing that the reduced form mechanism (π, p) is BIC and BIR.
• π ∈ P (F, D), guaranteeing π is feasible. Objective:
• max
, the expected revenue. 
Variables:
• λi(ti, t i ) for all i, ti ∈ Ti, t i ∈ T + i , the Lagrangian multipliers for Bayesian IC constraints. Constraints:
• λi(ti, t i ) ≥ 0 for all i, ti ∈ Ti, t i ∈ T + i , guaranteeing that the Lagrangian multipliers are non-negative. Objective: 
Useful Properties of the Dual Problem
Lemma 1 (Useful Dual). A dual solution λ is useful iff for each bidder i, λi forms a valid flow, i.e., iff the following satisfies flow conservation at all nodes except the source and the sink:
• Nodes: A super source s and a super sink ∅, along with a node ti for every type ti ∈ Ti. • Flow from s to ti of weight fi(ti), for all ti ∈ Ti.
• Flow from t to t of weight λi(t, t ) for all t ∈ T , and t ∈ T + i (including the sink). Proof. Let us think of L(λ, π, p) using expression (2) . Clearly, if there exists any i and ti ∈ Ti such that
then since pi(ti) is unconstrained and has a non-zero multiplier in the objective, max π∈P (F ,D),p L(λ, π, p) = +∞. Therefore, in order for λ to be useful, we must have
for all i and ti ∈ Ti. This is exactly saying what we described in the Lemma statement is a flow. The other direction is simple, whenever λ forms a flow, L(λ, π, p) only depends on π. Since π is bounded, the maximization problem has a finite value.
Definition 3 (Virtual Value Function).
For each λ, we define a corresponding virtual value function Φ(·), such that for every bidder i, every type ti ∈ Ti, Φi(ti
Theorem 2 (Virtual Welfare ≥ Revenue). Let λ be any useful dual solution and M = (π, p) any BIC mechanism. Then the revenue of M is ≤ the virtual welfare of π w.r.t. the virtual value function Φ(·) corresponding to λ. That is:
Furthermore, let λ * be the optimal dual variables and M * = (π * , p * ) be the revenue optimal BIC mechanism, then the expected virtual welfare with respect to Φ * (induced by λ * ) under π * equals the expected revenue of M * , and
Proof. When λ is useful, we can simplify L(λ, π, p) by removing all terms associated with p (because all such terms have a multiplier of zero, by Lemma 1), and replace the terms
, exactly the virtual welfare of π. Now, we only need to prove that L(λ, π, p) is greater than the revenue of M . Let us think of L(λ, π, p) using Expression (1). Since M is a BIC mechanism, π(ti) − π(t i ) − pi(ti) − pi(t i ) ≥ 0 for any i and ti ∈ Ti, t i ∈ T + i . Also, all the dual variables λ are nonnegative. Therefore, it is clear that L(λ, π, p) is at least as large as the revenue of M .
When λ * is the optimal dual soluation, by strong duality we know max π∈P (F ,D),p L(λ * , π, p) equals the revenue of M * . But we also know that L(λ * , π * , p * ) is at least as large as the revenue of M * , so π * necessarily maximizes the virtual welfare over all π ∈ P (F, D), with respect to the virtual transformation Φ * corresponding to λ * .
CANONICAL FLOW AND VIRTUAL VAL-UATION FUNCTION
In this section, we present a canonical way to set the Lagrangian multipliers/flow that induces our benchmarks. We use Pij(t−i) to denote the price that bidder i could pay to receive exactly item j in the VCG mechanism against bidders with types t−i. 9 We will partition the type space Ti
contains all types ti such that tij − Pij(t−i) ≥ 0 and j is the smallest index in argmax k {t ik − P ik (t−i)}. This partitions the types into subsets based on which item has the largest surplus (value minus price), and we break ties lexicographically.
For any bidder i and any type profile t−i of everyone else, we define λ 
∀ti and t
, λi(ti, t i ) > 0 only if ti and t i only differs on the j-th coordinate. We will now spend the majority of this section building our canonical flow and proving that it achieves certain desirable properties. We begin by establishing some nice properties of Φ (ti) for item k is exactly its value t ik for all k = j.
Proof. By the definition of Φ
Since ti ∈ Rj, by the definition of the flow λ
Next, we study Φ (t −i ) ij (ti) for coordinate j when ti is in
. This turns out the to be closely related to the ("ironed") virtual value function defined by Myerson [34] for a single dimensional distributions. For each i, j, we use ϕij(·) andφij(·) to denote the Myerson virtual value and ironed virtual value function for distribution Dij respectively.
Claim 2. For any type ti ∈ R (t −i ) j , if we only allow flow from type t i to ti, where t ik = t ik for all k = j and tij is the successor of t ij (the largest value smaller than t ij in the support of Dij), then
Proof. Let us fix ti,−j, and prove this is true for all choices of ti,−j. If tij is the largest value in Tij, then there is no flow coming into it except the one from the source, so Φ (t −i ) ij (ti) = tij. For every other value of tij, the flow coming from its predecessor (t ij , ti,−j) is exactly
This is because each type of the form (v, ti,−j) with v > tij is also in R (t −i ) j . So all flow that enters these types will be passed down to ti (and possibly further, before going to the sink), and the total amount of flow entering all of these types from the source is exactly Π k =j f ik (t ik ) · v∈T ij :v>t ij fij(v).
When Dij is regular, this is the canonical flow we use. When the distribution is not regular, we also need to "iron" the virtual values like in Myerson's work. Indeed, we use the same procedure: first convexify the revenue curve, then take the derivates of the convexified revenue curve as the "ironed" virtual values. To convexify the revenue curve, we only need to add loops to the flow we described in Claim 2. The next Lemma states that there exists a flow that performs this procedure and the resulting virtual value function Φ (t −i ) ij 
Proof. First, we show how to modify a flow to fix nonmonotonicities in Φ (t −i ) ij (·). Then we show how to use this procedure to iron.
If
(t i ), but tij < t ij (and ti,−j = t i,−j ), let's consider adding a cycle between ti and t i with weight w. Specifically, increase both λ 
(t i ), but without changing the average virtual value for item j among these two types, nor their virtual value for any other item, nor any other type's virtual values for any item. Now, observe that Myerson ironing can always be implemented in the following way: pick a disjoint set of intervals I1, . . . , I k that we wish to iron. This is decided by the convex hull of the revenue curve for the corresponding distribution. In particular, inside each interval I , the average virtual values of the highest N (for any N ) types is no larger than the average virtual values in the whole interval. Iteratively, find two adjacent types ti, t i ∈ I (for any ) such that Φ
(t i ), but tij < t ij (and ti,−j = t i,−j ). Then update each type's ironed virtual value to the average of their previous (ironed) virtual values. The end result will be that all types in Ij will have the same ironed virtual value, which is equal to the average virtual value on that interval. We have shown that we can certainly implement this procedure via the adjustments above.
The only catch between exact Myerson ironing and what we wish to do in our flow is that we are not ironing the entire support of Dij, but only the portion above some cutoff, C. The only effect this has is that it possibly truncates some interval I at C instead of its true (lower) lower bound. By the nature of ironing, we know that this necessarily implies that the average virtual value on I k ∩ [0, C) is larger than the average virtual value on I k ∩ [C, ∞) (recall: the ironing procedure is only to fix non-monotonicities. If the average virtual value on the lower interval were to be less than the average virtual value on the higher interval, we wouldn't iron them to the same ironed interval). So the virtual values we are left with after our procedure are certainly smaller than the true ironed virtual values, completing the proof.
Lemma 3. There exists a flow λ
satisfies the following properties:
(ti) ≤φij(tij), wherẽ ϕij(·) is Myerson's ironed virtual value for Dij.
• For any j, ti ∈ R
Proof. Combine Lemma 2 and Claim 1.
Lemma 3 isn't exactly the flow we want to use: note that we've defined several flows that depend on t−i, but we only get to select one flow for bidder i, and it doesn't get to change depending on t−i. Below we define a single flow essentially by averaging across all t−i according to the distributions.
Definition 4 (Flow). The flow for bidder i is λi
. Accordingly, the virtual value func-
Intuition behind Our Flow:
The social welfare is a trivial upper bound for revenue, which can be arbitrarily bad in the worst case. To design a good benchmark, we want to replace some of the terms that contribute the most to the social welfare with more manageable ones. The flow λ (t −i ) i aims to achieve exactly this. For each bidder i, we find the item j that contributes the most to the social welfare when awarded to i. Then we turn the virtual value of item j into its Myerson's single-dimensional virtual value, and keep the virtual value of all the other items their values. This transformation is feasible only if we know exactly t−i and could use a different dual solution for each t−i. Since we can't, a natural idea is to define a flow by taking an expectation over t−i. This is indeed our flow.
We conclude this section with one final lemma and our main theorem regarding the canonical flow. Both proofs are immediate corollaries of the flow definition and Theorem 2.
Theorem 3. Let M be any BIC mechanism with π, p as its reduced form. The expected revenue of M is upper bounded by the expected virtual welfare of the same allocation rule with respect to the canonical virtual value function Φi(·).
In particular,
WARM UP: SINGLE BIDDER
As a warm up, we start with the single bidder case. Throughout this section, we keep the same notations but drop the subscript i and superscript (t−i) whenever is appropriate.
Canonical Flow for a Single Bidder.
Since the canonical flow and the corresponding virtual valuation functions are defined based on other bidders types t−i, let us see how it is simplified when there is only a single bidder. First, the VCG prices are all 0, therefore λ is simply one flow instead of a distribution of different flows. Second, for the same reason, the region R0 is empty and region Rj contains all types t with tj ≥ t k for all k (see Figure 4 for an example). This simplifies Expression (3) to
We bound Single below, and Non-Favorite differently for unit-demand and additive valuations. Proof. Assume M is the mechanism that induces π(·). Consider another mechanism M for the Copies setting, such that for every type profile t, M serves agent j iff M allocates item j in the original setting and t ∈ Rj. As M is feasible in the original setting, M is clearly feasible in the Copies setting. When agent j's type is tj, its probability of being served in M is t −j f−j(t−j) · πj(tj, t−j) · I[t ∈ Rj] for all j and tj. Therefore, Single is the ironed virtual welfare achieved by M with respect toφ(·). Since the copies setting is a single dimensional setting, the optimal revenue OPT Copies equals the maximum ironed virtual welfare, thus no smaller than Single.
Upper Bound for a Unit-demand Bidder.
As mentioned previously, the bulk of our work is in obtaining a benchmark and properly decomposing it. Now that we have a decomposition, we can use techniques similar to those of Chawla et. al. [11, 12, 13] to approximate each term.
Lemma 6. When the types are unit-demand, for any feasible π(·), Non-Favorite ≤ OPT Copies .
Proof. Indeed, we will prove that Non-Favorite is upper bounded by the revenue of the VCG mechanism in the Copies setting. Define S(t) to be the second largest number in {t1, · · · , tm}. When the types are unit-demand, the Copies setting is a single item auction with m bidders. Therefore, if we run the Vickrey auction in the Copies setting, the revenue is t∈T f (t) · S(t). If t ∈ Rj, then there exists some k = j such that t k ≥ tj, so tj · I[t ∈ Rj] ≤ S(t) for all j. Therefore, t∈T j f (t)·πj(t)·tj·I[t /
∈ Rj] ≤ t∈T j f (t)· πj(t) · S(t) ≤ t∈T f (t) · S(t). The last inequality is because the bidder is unit demand, so j πj(t) ≤ 1.
Combining Lemma 5 and Lemma 6, we recover the result of Chawla et al. [13] :
Theorem 4. For a single unit-demand bidder, the optimal revenue is upper bounded by 2OPT
Copies .
Upper Bound for an Additive Bidder.
When the bidder is additive, we need to further decompose Non-Favorite into two terms we call Core and Tail. Let r = SRev. Again, we remind the reader that most of our work is already done in obtaining our decomposition. The remaining portion of the proof is indeed inspired by prior work of Babaioff et. al. [1] . However, it is worth noting that the "core-tail decomposition" presented here is perhaps more transparent: we are simply splitting a sum into two parts depending on whether the buyer's value for item j is larger than some threshold.
Proof. By the definition of Rj, for any given tj,
It is clear that by setting price tj on each item separately, we can make revenue at least
The buyer will certainly choose to purchase something at price tj whenever there is an item she values above tj. So we see that this term is upper bounded by r. Thus, Tail ≤ r · j t j >r fj(tj) = j r ·Prt j ∼D j [tj > r] = the revenue of selling each item separately at price r, which is also ≤ r.
Lemma 8. If we sell the grand bundle at price Core−2r, the bidder will purchase it with probability at least 1/2. In other words, BRev ≥ Core 2 −r, or Core ≤ 2BRev+2SRev.
Proof. We will first need a technical lemma (also used in [1] , but proved here for completeness).
Lemma 9. Let x be a positive single dimensional random variable drawn from F of finite support, 10 such that for any number a, a · Prx∼F [x ≥ a] ≤ B where B is an absolute constant. Then for any positive number s, the second moment of the random variable xs = x · I[x ≤ s] is upper bounded by 2B · s.
Proof. Let {a1, . . . , a } be the intersection of the support of F and [0, s], and a0 = 0. 
Therefore,
, as we can sell the grand bundle at price E[c] − 2r, and it will be purchased with probability at least 1/2.
Theorem 5. For a single additive bidder, the optimal revenue is ≤ 2BRev + 4SRev.
Proof. Combining Lemma 5, 7 and 8, the optimal revenue is upper bounded by OPT Copies +SRev + 2BRev + 2SRev. It is not hard to see that OPT Copies = SRev, because the optimal auction in the copies setting just sells everything separately. So the optimal revenue is upper bounded by 2BRev + 4SRev. 10 The same statement holds for continuous distribution as well, and can be proved using integration by parts.
MULTIPLE BIDDERS
In this section, we show how to use the upper bound in Theorem 3 to show that deterministic DSIC mechanisms can achieve a constant fraction of the (randomized) optimal BIC revenue in multi-bidder settings when the bidders valuations are all unit-demand or additive. Similar to the single bidder case, we first decompose the upper bound (Expression 3) into three components and bound them separately. In the last expression in what follows, we call the first term Non-Favorite, the second term Under and the third term Single. We further break Non-Favorite into two parts, Over and Surplus and bound them separately. The following are the approximation factors we achieve:
Theorem 6. For multiple unit-demand bidders, the optimal revenue is upper bounded by 4OPT
Theorem 7. For multiple additive bidders, the optimal revenue is upper bounded by 6OPT
Copies +2BVCG.
Note that a simple posted-price mechanism achieves revenue OPT Copies /6 when buyers are unit-demand [12, 30] , and selling each item separately using Myerson's auction achieves revenue OPT Copies when buyers are additive. Therefore, the CHMS/KW [12, 30] posted-price mechanism achieves a 24-approximation to the optimal BIC mechanism (previously, it was known to be a 33.75-approximation), and Yao's approximation ratios [38] are improved from 69 to 8. Some parts of the following analysis draw inspiration from prior works of Chawla et. al. [12] and Yao [38] , however, much of the analysis also represents new techniques. In particular, it is worth pointing out that our proof of Theorem 7 looks similar to our single-bidder case, whereas Yao's original proof required the entirely new machinery of "β-adjusted revenue" and "β-exclusive mechanisms." Below is our decomposition, first into Non-Favorite, Under, and Single, then further decomposing Non-Favorite into Over and Surplus.
Analyzing Surplus for Unit-demand Bidders: The proof of this lemma is similar in spirit to Lemma 6.
Lemma 10. When the types are unit-demand, for any feasible π(·), Surplus ≤ OPT Copies .
Proof. Indeed, we will prove that Surplus is bounded above by the revenue of the VCG mechanism in the Copies setting. For any i define Si(ti, v−i) to be the second largest number in {ti1 − Pi1(v−i), · · · , tim − Pim(v−i)}. Now consider running the VCG mechanism on type profile (ti, v−i). An agent (i, j) is served in the VCG mechanism in the Copies setting, iff item j is allocated to i in the VCG mechanism in the original setting, which is equivalent to saying tij − Pij(v−i) ≥ 0 and tij − Pij(v−i) ≥ t ik − P ik (v−i) for all k. The Copies setting is single-dimensional, therefore any agent's payment is her threshold bid. For agent (i, j), her threshold bid is Pij(v−i) + max{0, max k =j t ik − P ik (v−i)} which is at least Si(ti, v−i). On the other hand, for any i, whenever ∃j , t ij − P ij (v−i) ≥ 0, there exists some ji such that (i, ji) is served in the VCG mechanism. Combining the two conclusions above, we show that on any profile (ti, v−i), the payment in the VCG mechanism collected from agents in
So the total revenue of the VCG Copies mechanism is at least:
Next we argue for any j and (ti, v−i), the following inequality holds.
(tij − Pij(v−i))
We only need to consider the case when the LHS is non-zero.
In that case, the RHS has value Si(ti, v−i), and also there exists some k such that
So now we can rewrite Surplus and upper bound it with the revenue of the VCG mechanism in the Copies setting.
The last line is upper bounded by the revenue of the VCG mechanism in the Copies setting by our work above, which is clearly upper bounded by OPT Copies .
Analyzing Surplus for Additive Bidders:.
Similar to the single bidder case, we will again break the term Surplus into the Core and the Tail, and analyze them separately. Before we proceed, we first define the cutoffs. Let
The observant reader will notice that this is bidder i's ex-ante payment for item j in Ronen's single-item mechanism [35] conditioned on other bidders types being v−i, but this connection is not necessary to understand the proof. Further let ri(v−i) = j rij(v−i), ri = Ev −i ∼D −i [ri(v−i)] and r = i ri, the expected revenue of running Ronen's mechanism separately for each item (again, the connection to Ronen's mechanism is not necessary to understand the proof). We first bound Tail and Core, using arguments similar to the single item case (Lemmas 7 and 8),
Proof. First, by union bound
By the definition of r ik (v−i), we certainly have
, so we can also derive:
.
Using these two inequalities, we can upper bound Tail:
− r. In other words, 2r + 2BVCG ≥ Core.
Proof. Fix any vi ∈ T−i, let tij ∼ Dij, define two new random variables
So we can rewrite Core as
Now we will describe a VCG mechanism with per bidder entry fee. Define an entry fee function for bidder i depending on v−i as ei(v−i) = j E[cij(v−i)] − 2ri(v−i). We will show that for any i and other bidders types v−i ∈ T−i, bidder i accepts the entry fee ei(v−i) with probability at least 1/2. Since bidders are additive, the VCG mechanism is exactly m separate Vickrey auctions, one for each item. So Pij(v−i) = max =i {v j }, and for any set of S, its Clarke Pivot price for i to receive set S is j∈S Pij(v−i).
That also means j bij(v−i) is the random variable that represents bidder i's utility in the VCG mechanism when other bidders bids are v−i. If we can prove Pr[ j bij(v−i) ≥ ei(v−i)] ≥ 1/2 for all v−i, then we know bidder i accepts the entry fee with probability at least 1/2.
It is not hard to see for any nonnegative number a,
Therefore, because each cij(v−i) ∈ [0, ri(v−i)], by Lemma 9 we can again bound the second moment as:
By Chebyshev inequality, we know
Therefore, as bij(v−i) ≥ cij(v−i), we can conclude:
So the entry fee is accepted with probability at least 1/2 for all i and v−i. So:
Analyzing Single, Over and Under: First we consider Single, which is similar to Lemma 5.
Lemma 13. For any feasible π(·), Single ≤ OPT Copies .
Proof. Assume M is the ex-post allocation rule that induces π(·). Consider another ex-post allocation rule M for the copies setting, such that for every type profile t, if M allocates item j to bidder i in the original setting then M serves agent (i, j) with probability Prv
As M is feasible in the original setting, M is clearly feasible in the Copies setting. When agent (i, j) has type tij, her probability of being served in M is
for all j and tij. Therefore, Single is the ironed virtual welfare achieved by M with respect toφ(·). Since the copies setting is a single dimensional setting, the optimal revenue OPT Copies equals the maximum ironed virtual welfare, thus no smaller than Single.
Next, we move onto Over. We begin with the following technical propositions: Proposition 1. Let π(·) be any reduced form of a BIC mechanism in the original setting. Define
Then Πij(tij) is monotone in tij.
Proof. In fact, for all ti,−j, we must have πij(·, ti,−j) monotone increasing in tij. Assume for contradiction that this were not the case, and let tij < t ij with πij(tij, ti,−j) > πij(t ij , ti,−j). Then (tij, ti,−j), (t ij , ti,−j) form a 2-cycle that violates cyclic monotonicity. This is because both types value all items except for j exactly the same. Proposition 2. For any v ∈ T , any π(·) that is a reduced form of some BIC mechanism,
Proof. Recall from Proposition 1 that every BIC interim form π(·) in the original setting corresponds to a monotone interim form in the copies setting, Π(·). Let M be any (possibly randomized) allocation rule that induces Π(·), and p(·) a corresponding price rule (wlog we can let (M, p) be ex-post IR). Consider the following mechanism instead: on input t, first run (M, p) to (possibly randomly) determine a set of potential winners. Then, if (i, j) is a potential winner, offer (i, j) service at price max{pij(t), Pij(v−i)). Whenever (i, j) is a potential winner, tij ≥ pij(t). It is clear that in the event that (i, j) is a potential winner, and tij ≥ Pij(t−i), (i, j) will accept the price and pay at least Pij(v−i). Therefore, for any t as long as (i, j) is served in M , then the payment from (i, j) in the new proposed mechanism is at least Pij(v−i)I[tij ≥ Pij(v−i)]. That means the total revenue of the new mechanism is at least Proof. This can be proved by rewriting Over and then applying Proposition 2.
When there is only one bidder, Under is always 0. Here, Under ≤ OPT Copies . We apply Proposition 3 (below) once for each type profile t, using the allocation of this mechanism on type profile t to specify (ij, j) and let xj = ti j j . Then taking the convex combination of the RHS of Proposition 3 for all profiles t with multipliers f (t) gives Under≤ OPT Copies . Proof. Before beginning the proof of Proposition 3, we will need the following definition and theorem due to Gul and Stacchetti [23] .
Definition 5. Let WT (S) be the maximum attainable welfare using only bidders in T and items in S. Now with Theorem 8, consider in the Copies setting the VCG mechanism with lazy reserve xj for each copy (i, j). Specifically, we will first solicit bids, then find the maxwelfare allocation and call all (i, j) who get allocated temporary winners. Then, if (i, j) is a temporary winner, (i, j) is given the option to receive service for the maximum of their Clarke pivot price and xj. It is clear that in this mechanism, whenever any agent (i, j) receives service, the price she pays is at least xj. Also, it is not hard to see the allocation rule is monotone, thus this is a truthful mechanism. Next, we argue for any v ∈ T and j ∈ S, whenever Pi j j (v−i j ) > xj, there exists some i such that (i, j) is served in the mechanism above.
By the definition of Clarke pivot price, we know First, we show that if item j is allocated to some bidder i in the max-welfare allocation in the original setting then vij ≥ Pij(v−i). Assume S to be the set of items allocated to bidder i. Since the VCG mechanism is truthful, the utility for winning set S is better than winning set S − {j}: Now we still need to argue that whenever Pi j j (v−i) ≥ xj, item j is always allocated in the max-welfare allocation to some bidder i with vij ≥ xj.
1. If agent (ij, j) is a temporary winner,
Therefore, agent (ij, j) will accept the price. contradiction. So now we see that for any j ∈ S there is certainly some i such that (i, j) is served whenever Pi j j > xj, and therefore the revenue of this mechanism in the Copies setting is at least v∈T f (v) · j∈S xj · I[Pi j j (v−i j ) > xj], which is exactly the same as the sum in the proposition statement.
Lemma 15. Under ≤ OPT Copies .
Proof. The idea is to interpret Under as the revenue of the following mechanism: let M be the mechanism that induces π(·). Sample t from D, let S be the set of agents that will be served in M for type profile t in the copies setting. Use tij to be the reserve price for j if (i, j) ∈ S, and use the mechanism in Proposition 3.
First, the inner sum only depends on ti, so the maximum of Under is achieved by a π(·) induced by some deterministic mechanism. Wlog, we consider π(·) is induced by a deterministic mechanism whose ex-post allocation rule is x(·).
Let us rewrite Under using x(·): Combining the above lemmas now yields our theorems: Proof of Theorem 6: Combine Lemmas 10, 13, 14 and 15. 2
Proof of Theorem 7: Combining Lemmas 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15, we get the optimal revenue is upper bounded by
3OPT
Copies + 3r + 2BVCG.
Since OPT Copies = SMyerson and SMyerson ≥ r when bidders are additive; we proved our statement. 2
